While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance
was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP
was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely
but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office
that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision
would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the
key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in
shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the
German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they
did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not
driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to
move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and
was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow.
<...>
Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree
that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!”
<...>
Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a
member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western
European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this
approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but
he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward.
Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree
today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.”
After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part
of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to
anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel
agreed to delete “one day” <...>
<...>
British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to
President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure
what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t
just make them members of NATO.”
The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin
would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit.
<...>
Moscow’s very public goal had of course
been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of
course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received
something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political
promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members.
That had never happened before.
<...>
The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine
as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete.
He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians
and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under
Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The
issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence
of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to
veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all
of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there
as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he
was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia
viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct
threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed
against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is
not based on promises.” [0]
Here are the facts:
While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow.
<...> Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!”
<...> Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward. Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.” After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel agreed to delete “one day” <...>
<...> British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO.”
The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit.
<...> Moscow’s very public goal had of course been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members. That had never happened before.
<...> The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete. He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is not based on promises.” [0]
[0] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...