Not quite. Skinner calls the mind, will, ego, and the like explanatory fictions, because they are supposed to explain something but fail to explain, for at least two reasons (criticisms of mentalism): autonomy[1] and superfluity[2].
He does not deny their existence, he just deems those explanatory fictions impractical to focus on (see the two criticisms below) and that they are not a necessity or a requirement when it comes to observing and modifying behavior. Radical behaviorists take the pragmatic approach.
The definition of "cognition" in the context of behavior modification is "covert verbalizations and imagery; frequently called believing, thinking, expecting, and perceiving". Its existence is not denied by radical behaviorists.
> An important aspect of Skinner's approach is that he rejected the distinction of a mental world that is separate from the physical world (which is mentalism, a form of dualism). Thus, although he accepted that private speech and covert images exist, he regarded them as being no different in principle from public speech and overt acts of seeing. Moreover, like Watson, he emphasized the importance in a science of behavior of studying the effects of the external environment on overt behavior.
In any case, to clarify, I am not trying to say that cognitive-behavioral therapy = radical behaviorism. What I am saying is that Skinner's conditioning theories (along with Watson, and radical behaviorism in general) had a foundational influence over the development of cognitive-behavioral therapy. It greatly influenced both the development of behavior modification and cognitive-behavioral therapy.
You might want to check out the differences between the behavioral approach and the psychodiagnostic approach. They have different goals, methods, and so forth, but they are supposed to work together. :)
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I apologize if my comment raised more questions than provided answers, but this subject is really really broad and I would even dare to say complicated. If you are really curious then you should probably read the two books I mentioned (at the very least).
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[1] The capacity of a thing, particularly an organism, to behave. When a hypothetical entity, such as mind, inner self, or an inner homunculus, is said to act so as to cause observed behavior, the supposed autonomy obstructs inquiry by diverting study to the impossible task of explaining the behavior of something that cannot be observed.
[2] Mental causes only restate the original observation in more obscure terms. When mental causes are inferred from the behavior they are purported to explain, the supposed "explanation" is purely circular, is superfluous, and impedes efforts to find an explanation based on natural events.
He does not deny their existence, he just deems those explanatory fictions impractical to focus on (see the two criticisms below) and that they are not a necessity or a requirement when it comes to observing and modifying behavior. Radical behaviorists take the pragmatic approach.
The definition of "cognition" in the context of behavior modification is "covert verbalizations and imagery; frequently called believing, thinking, expecting, and perceiving". Its existence is not denied by radical behaviorists.
> An important aspect of Skinner's approach is that he rejected the distinction of a mental world that is separate from the physical world (which is mentalism, a form of dualism). Thus, although he accepted that private speech and covert images exist, he regarded them as being no different in principle from public speech and overt acts of seeing. Moreover, like Watson, he emphasized the importance in a science of behavior of studying the effects of the external environment on overt behavior.
In any case, to clarify, I am not trying to say that cognitive-behavioral therapy = radical behaviorism. What I am saying is that Skinner's conditioning theories (along with Watson, and radical behaviorism in general) had a foundational influence over the development of cognitive-behavioral therapy. It greatly influenced both the development of behavior modification and cognitive-behavioral therapy.
I really recommend the book I mentioned above, along with this one: https://www.amazon.com/Behavior-Modification-What-How-Do/dp/...
You might want to check out the differences between the behavioral approach and the psychodiagnostic approach. They have different goals, methods, and so forth, but they are supposed to work together. :)
---
I apologize if my comment raised more questions than provided answers, but this subject is really really broad and I would even dare to say complicated. If you are really curious then you should probably read the two books I mentioned (at the very least).
---
[1] The capacity of a thing, particularly an organism, to behave. When a hypothetical entity, such as mind, inner self, or an inner homunculus, is said to act so as to cause observed behavior, the supposed autonomy obstructs inquiry by diverting study to the impossible task of explaining the behavior of something that cannot be observed.
[2] Mental causes only restate the original observation in more obscure terms. When mental causes are inferred from the behavior they are purported to explain, the supposed "explanation" is purely circular, is superfluous, and impedes efforts to find an explanation based on natural events.