> Only two nuclear weapons have been deployed ever.

… intentionally; if you want to feel a stark sense of wonder that we ever survived the height of the nuclear-weapons age, you could do worse than to read Schlosser's "Command and Control" (https://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Ill...).

I recently finished Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety [0]. I can't recommend the book enough for how eye opening it really is into how blasé we have been with nuclear weapons.

We've been reckless and by all accounts it is a miracle we haven't had a serious accident (there have been a few, just not on our own soil). The number of close calls is just astounding.

Further the book, at one point, talks about America's position on Russia and the attempts to keep them from getting "the bomb". It is exactly what has played out and will continue to play out with North Korea and Iran. History is repeating itself and we sure haven't learned from it.

[0] https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/

I swear I read about this in Schlosser's "Command and Control" a couple of years ago.. maybe not.

https://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Ill...

"Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety" by Eric Schlosser enumerates accidents related to nuclear weapons, many of which do not end in criticality due to sheer luck in most cases. Illusion of safety indeed.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?...

There's a great book all about the old decisions on these topics by Eric Schlosser called Command and Control (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/) which is also available as a PBS documentary http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/command-and...

There's some pretty interesting rational behind the creation of those kinds of munition (including the "nuclear rifle") but their argument seems to boil down to 2 things: 1, at the time where the USSR and the Western European states were still living with a divided germany US assessments found that the number of troops we could collectively muster were vastly less than the current standing european force of the USSR. People were very worried there wouldn't be much we could do if a land invasion overran the troops other than immediately retaliate with a full nuclear strike against soviet cities. These were though of as a weird middle ground

2. The Army was getting worried it would be cut out of money and relevance as more and more focus was moved to the Air Force because most weapons at the time were delivered by planes under the control of the strategic air command. They became ever more worried later as submarine launched missiles gave more nuclear firepower to the navy. Afraid they'd be totally left out the Army started requesting hundreds of thousands of "tactical" weapons like nuclear landmines, nuclear man launched missiles, nuclear artillery shells etc.

The book "Command and Control" spends a good amount of time on this plan.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_awdb_G.g...

Command and Control [1] is highly recommended, and discusses this very situation, along with the always/never constraints on nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons should Always go off when used legitimately, and Never go off when not authorized.

Before reading this I had never really thought through the idea of fail-safe, especially that it has an implicit opposite: fail-deadly.

1. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?...

From reading Command and Control, a lot of the US arsenal was manifestly unsafe for a long time. Based on the number of accidents, and lack of criticality, I suspect there was some super secret design choice or design flaw which meant many classes of weapon would never go critical at all. Someone probably made the decision that only a deterrent was important, so a bunch of unsafe weapons should instead be rendered largely inert while making other gestures of readiness. I don't have any data to support that other than just the lack of unintentional nuclear detonations.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00C5R7F8G/ref=dp-kindle-re...

This story is often posted but never often enough. The incident illustrates why there is no "right" to nuclear weapons on the basis of fairness, sovereignty or deterrence - contrary to the zealous cries of recent and aspiring members of the nuclear club. This near global catastrophe is also a reminder that government policy is often tragically imperfect, and that one stubborn independently minded bureaucrat is often the only check and balance available. For anyone interested in the many similar incidents in the US, there is this sobering book, Command and Control, Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident...: https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00C5R7F8G/ref=oh_aui_sear...

The SAC had plenty of nasty screw ups, including littering large areas of Spain and (iirc) Greenland with plutonium dust from nuclear weapons accidents. It's also pretty much dumb luck that we've never had an accidental detonation of an SAC-controlled nuclear weapon:

http://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Eric-Schlosser-ebook/d...

One would hope so. "Command And Control" is worth a read; it reviews the history of nuclear weapons, focusing mostly on their safety record. (Spoiler alert: it's bad.)

http://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Illu...

Fascinating read about this topic: http://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Illu...

Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

Book link: http://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Illu...