The German industrial war machine in fact remained surprisingly effective in the face of allied bombing until early 1945 [1] when the scale of the bombing finally became overwhelming. But by this time the Germans were going to lose anyway because they couldn’t continue to handle devastating tactical attrition on two fronts. Prior to 1945, German manufacturing was more constrained by the (non) availability of critical resources (coal and steel) than affected by allied bombing [2]. The bombing also failed to decisively impact German civilian morale until very late in the war [3].
However, bombing did force the Germans to prioritise air defence of their heartlands over tactical air operations against allied ground forces, so that German ground forces and their logistics chains operated under punishingly hostile skies from D-Day onwards.
However, bombing did force the Germans to prioritise air defence of their heartlands over tactical air operations against allied ground forces, so that German ground forces and their logistics chains operated under punishingly hostile skies from D-Day onwards.
[1] https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/53742/the-bombing-war/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wages_of_Destruction
[3] https://www.amazon.co.uk/German-War-Nation-Under-1939-45-x/d...
[EDIT - reworded for clarity and additional detail]