> The Buddhist argument doesn't say that the composite isn't perceivable or doesn't exist, just that it only exists conditionally. Nobody denies you can't see the composite.
I don't think anyone makes exactly this claim. From the article, which I presume draws faithfully from the source text[0]:
"Both sides make reference to ordinary objects, such as a clay pot. Both sides agree that the pot is ultimately made up of unobservable atoms. But the Buddhist reductionist says that those atoms are really all that exist, that there is no such thing as a composite whole over and above them."
The point of disagreement between the Buddhist reductionist and the Nyāya commentator, then, is over the existence of composites as bona fide things versus, say, perceptual illusions or whatever. Because both the Buddhist reductionist and the Nyāya commentator refer to composites, clearly both accept composites as objects of perception, so what is perceived is not the point of disagreement, in which case where does the misunderstanding over the conditionality of composites enter the picture? Again, the Nyāya commentator doesn't deny that composites are composed of atoms, nor that their existence is contingent or temporary. Additionally, it seems that if atoms are what ultimately exist, then there would appear to be at least some things which are not conditioned, if I understand the term.
Now, given that, the counterargument is epistemological in nature, specifically, that if what we know about the world begins with perception, and what is perceived are composites and not atoms, and that our knowledge of atoms is inferred from our knowledge of what is perceived, then it is incoherent to also deny the existence of composites because our knowledge of atoms depends on our knowledge of composites. To deny the reality of the latter is to deny the knowledge of anything that depends on the former being the case.
I don't think anyone makes exactly this claim. From the article, which I presume draws faithfully from the source text[0]:
"Both sides make reference to ordinary objects, such as a clay pot. Both sides agree that the pot is ultimately made up of unobservable atoms. But the Buddhist reductionist says that those atoms are really all that exist, that there is no such thing as a composite whole over and above them."
The point of disagreement between the Buddhist reductionist and the Nyāya commentator, then, is over the existence of composites as bona fide things versus, say, perceptual illusions or whatever. Because both the Buddhist reductionist and the Nyāya commentator refer to composites, clearly both accept composites as objects of perception, so what is perceived is not the point of disagreement, in which case where does the misunderstanding over the conditionality of composites enter the picture? Again, the Nyāya commentator doesn't deny that composites are composed of atoms, nor that their existence is contingent or temporary. Additionally, it seems that if atoms are what ultimately exist, then there would appear to be at least some things which are not conditioned, if I understand the term.
Now, given that, the counterargument is epistemological in nature, specifically, that if what we know about the world begins with perception, and what is perceived are composites and not atoms, and that our knowledge of atoms is inferred from our knowledge of what is perceived, then it is incoherent to also deny the existence of composites because our knowledge of atoms depends on our knowledge of composites. To deny the reality of the latter is to deny the knowledge of anything that depends on the former being the case.
[0] https://www.amazon.com/Nyaya-sutra-Selections-Early-Commenta...